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STOCKTON THEATRES, INC.

v.

PALERMO

[47 C.2d

peal all laws in "conflict therewith shall be of no further
force or effect."
[7] Costs-On Appeal-Items Allowable.-The Legislature has
the power to enact, subsequent to the effective date of the
Rules on Appeal, a statute which would have the effect of
amending Rules on Appeal, rule 26 (c), listing additional items
of costs to be recovered on appeal.
[8] Courts-Judicial CounciL-The rule-making power of the
Judicial Council is limited by existing law, the Constitution
reserving to the Legislature and the people the primary and
higher right to provide rules of procedure for courts with
the secondary right in the Judicial Council to adopt rules only
when and where the higher authority of the Legislature and
the people has not been exercised.
[9] Costs-What Law Governs.-Costs are given only by statutory
direction and their allowance depends on the terms of the
statute in force at the time of accrual of the right to have them
taxed, and a rule pertaining to allowance of costs may be
changed or modified by statute during pendency of the proceeding.
[10] Id.- Items Allowable- Bond Premiums.-Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1035, which permits the premium on any surety bond to
be included as an item of costs to the party to whom costs are
allowed, includes the qualification "unless the court determines
that the bond was unnecessary," and the court's order disallowing the cost of a bond premium on the ground that such
a cost was not specified in Rules on Appeal, rule 26(c), and
that Code Civ. Proc., § 1035, did not apply at the appeal level,
was not a finding that the bond was unnecessary, and in the
absence of such a finding the cause on appeal should be reversed with directions that the trial court determine whether
or not a bond was necessary.
[11] Appeal-Right of Review- Loss of Right- Acceptance of
Benefits.-A judgment creditor may accept a tender of that
portion of the judgment favorable to him and to which he is
admittedly entitled without losing his right to appeal from
a severable portion of the judgment unfavorable to him.
[12] Judgments- Satisfaction.-An order granting defendant's
motion to enter satisfaction of judgment and to release all
attachments was error where the court did not take into consideration as a cost item recoverable by the judgment creditor
the amount of a bond premium which was the subject of a
pending appeal, and where defendant did not give an undertaking under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 554, 555, for the release of
the attachments in the amount of costs demanded by plaintiff.
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 319 et seq.; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 862 et seq.
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APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County granting motions to retax costs on appeal
and to enter satisfaction of judgment, discharge liens created
by the recording of abstracts of judgment and to release all
levies of attachment or execution. George F. Buck and
Thomas B. Quinn, Judges. Reversed with directions.
Freed & Freed, Eli Freed and Eugene A. Mash for Appellant.
Smith & Zeller for Respondent Palermo.
CARTER, J.-Stockton Theatres, Inc., appeals from two
orders (1) that portion of an order retaxing costs filed on
December 17, 1954, which granted the motion of defendant
Palermo to retax costs as to the premiums on a surety bond
to preserve an attachment on appeal; (2) from a minute
order of January 27, 1955, granting the motion of defendant
Palermo to enter satisfaction of judgment and to discharge
the liens created by the recording of abstracts of judgment
and to release all levies of attachment or execution.
On June 5, 1944, Emil Palermo, the owner and lessor of
the Star Theatre in Stockton, brought an action for declaratory relief against the lessee, Stockton Theatres, Inc., in
an endeavor to have the lease declared void because the stockholders of the lessee were Japanese nationals. On June 11,
1945, the lease was declared void. Immediately thereafter
Palermo brought an action for forcible detainer and a judgment was rendered in his favor whereby he obtained possession of the theater. Stockton Theatres appealed from both
judgments. The judgment in the declaratory relief action
was reversed by this court in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres,
Inc., 32 Cal.2d 53 [195 P.2d 1]. This had the effect of
adjudicating that the lease was valid and that under it Stockton Theatres was entitled to possession of the theater as a
tenant thereof.
Stockton Theatres then brought an action for restitution.
During the pendency of the first appeals Palermo had operated the theater profitably and Stockton Theatres asked that
he be compelled to account to it for the income he had derived therefrom. The trial court took an account and adjudged that Stockton Theatres recover from Palermo the
sum of $13,658.75. Both parties appealed. The appeal was
decided in favor of Stockton Theatres and the judgment
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which he contends has become the law of the case, Stockton
Theatres has no legal authority to seek the cost of the
premium on the bond as an item of costs on appeal. It
seems that for the purposes of the law of the case, the statement heretofore referred to which held that section 946
was only applicable where the defendant had prevailed in
the trial court may be considered dictum. The court concluded as follows: ''The motion to vacate the attachments
is denied, and as previously noted, the motion to dismiss
plaintiff's appeal is deferred, to be considered and determined together with the appeal on its merits." If, as previously set forth, the District Court believed that the lien
of attachment had "merged with the judgment [and] said
section [946] has no applicability," it would appear that
defendants' motion to discharge the attachment should have
been granted rather than denied. This could, however, apply
only insofar as the judgment went-to the sum of $13,658.75
awarded to plaintiff. [2] The discussion or determination of
a point not necessary to the disposition of a question that
is decisive of the appeal is generally regarded as obiter
dictum and not as the law of the case. We held in Allen
v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Assn. , 22 Cal.2d 474, 489
[139 P.2d 321], that "This discussion is obviously based
upon the erroneous assumption that the presentation of a
claim by the investor was still required under the 1935 amendment, and this in spite of the inclusion of the words 'without
presenting a claim' in the statute. .And the doctrine of the
law of the case does not require this court to follow an
interpretation which is clearly obiter dictum. The statement
of facts in the discussion, assumed for the purpose of illustrating the necessity of the court's construction of the statute,
presupposed a situation. . . . '' [3] In the instant case the
court presupposed a situation for the purpose of illustrating
its theory of how the statute should be construed. The illustration was clearly erroneous and it is obvious that the
decision was not predicated upon the court's construction
of the statute. Hence, we are not bound to follow the District
Court's erroneous interpretation of the scope of section 946
of the Code of Civil Procedure under the doctrine of the law
of the case. (See also Hammond v. McDonald, 49 Cal..App.2d
671 [122 P.2d 332] ; 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 698, p. 604; Millsap v.
Balfour, 158 Cal. 711 [112 P. 450] ; Mttlford v. Estudillo,
32 Cal. 131.) In order to avoid confusion the holding of

Dec.1956] STOCKTON THEATRES, INc. v. PALERMO

475

[47 C.2d 469; 304 P.2d 71

the District Court of .Appeal in this respect is specifically
disapproved.
Section 961 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which became
effective in 1943, provides that "The Judicial Council shall
have the power to prescribe by rules for the practice and
procedure on appeal, and for the time and manner in which
the records on such appeals shall be made up and filed, in
all civil actions and proceedings in all courts of this State . . . .
"The rules reported as aforesaid shall take effect on July
1, 1943, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall
be of no further force or effect.''
Section 1034 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
"In appeals from the superior and municipal courts, costs
shall be awarded as provided in rules adopted by the Judicial
Council. . . . The party entitled to costs, or to whom costs
are awarded, may recover all amounts actually paid out by
him in connection with said appeal, and the preparation of
the record for the appeal. . . . " ( Stats. 1945, ch. 40, § 5.)
Rule 26(c) of the Rules on Appeal (36 Cal.2d 22, 23)
lists certain costs which may be recovered. The premium
paid on a bond to preserve an attachment on appeal is not
one of the items of costs listed.
Section 1035 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
added to the Code in 1951 (Stats. 1951, ch. 1327, § 1) provides: "Whenever in this code or by other provision of law
costs are allowed to a party to an action or other proceeding,
such costs shall include the premium on any surety bond
which was procured by the party entitled to recover costs
in connection with the action or proceeding unless the court
determines that the bond was unnecessary.''
Section 1035 has, apparently, never before been construed
by an appellate court. Stockton Theatres argues that it
is a general provision and applies to the appellate stage
of a proceeding as well as to the trial stage; Palermo contends that it applies only to the trial stage and that rule
26 (c) of the Rules on Appeal is the exclusive measure of
the costs which may be recovered on appeal. Stockton Theatres
argues that the Legislature had the power to adopt section
1035 and that it superseded any rule in conflict with it.
Palermo concedes that the Legislature had the power to
provide in section 1035 that the premium on a surety bond
was a proper item of costs on appeal, but argues that it
did not do so because the appeal stage was not specifically
set forth in the section. The statute is general-it specifies
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Procedure in the amount of the costs demanded by Stockton
Theatres. It is contended that a satisfaction of the judgment
is the last act and the end of the proceedings (Brochier v.
Brochier, 17 Cal.2d 822, 825 [112 P.2d 602] ; Cason v. Glass
Bottle Blowers Assn., 113 Cal.App.2d 263 [247 P.2d 931])
and that except where a valid release is given, or there is a
lawful agreement otherwise providing, a judgment may be
satisfied or discharged only by payment in full with accrued
interest and costs (2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., p. 2329).
It would appear that since the judgment creditor (Stockton
Theatres, Inc.) cannot prevent the judgment debtor (Palermo)
from avoiding possible liability for accruing interest, pending an appeal, by refusing tender of the amount due (People
v. Roath, 62 Cal.App.2d 241 [144 P.2d 648] ), that the trial
court properly entered a satisfaction of judgment as to the
amount of the judgment, interest, and the undisputed costs.
However, Stockton Theatres appealed from the order retaxing
costs as to the amount of $6,980.49 which was stricken by the
trial court. [11] The judgment creditor may accept a tender
of that portion of the judgment favorable to him and to which
he is admittedly entitled without losing his right to appeal from
a severable portion of the judgment unfavorable to him
(Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal.2d 79 [230 P.2d 816]). Section 554
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that whenever any defendant has appeared in the action "such defendant may upon reasonable notice to the plaintiff, apply to
the court in which the action is pending, or to the judge
thereof, for an order to discharge the attachment wholly,
or in part; and upon the execution of the undertaking mentioned in the next section, an order may be made releasing
from the operation of the attachment, any or all of the property of such defendant attached . . . . " Section 555 provides
for the undertaking which the court or judge ''must require''
before making such an order.
[12] It appears that the trial court erred in releasing
Stockton Theatres' attachment without taking into consideration the amount of the cost of the bond premium which was
the subject of a pending appeal, and in ordering a full satisfaction of judgment. The order of the trial court would have
been correct had defendant complied with sections 554 and
555 of the Code of Civil Procedure as heretofore set forth.
For the reasons heretofore set forth the orders appealed
from are reversed and the trial court directed to determine
the necessity for the bond required to preserve the attachment
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pending appeal, and, if it is determined that such bond was
necessary, allow the amount of the premium paid therefor
as an item of the costs on appeal to which plaintiff is entitled.
The amount so allowed to be a lien upon any property of
Palermo covered by the attachment heretofore levied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 5879.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ED FARMER, Appellant.
[1] Chattel Mortgages-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.Intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense of
selling mortgaged chattels without giving the mortgagee prior
notice in writing. (Disapproving People v. Phillips, 27 Cal.
App. 409, 150 P. 75; People v. Phillips, 30 Cal.App. 31, 157 P.
1003, 1005.)
[2] !d.-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.-Pen. Code, § 538,
designates the offense of selling mortgaged chattels without
giving written notice to the mortgagee as "larceny," and to
establish the crime of larceny a felonious intent to steal must
be proved.
[3] !d.-Offenses-Sale of Mortgaged Property.-Where a mortgagee of chattels consents to their sale, Pen. Code, § 538, may
not be construed as making it a crime for the mortgagor to
fail to give prior written notice of intent to sell.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced
County and from an order denying a new trial. R. R. Sischo,
Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for sale of mortgaged chattels without giving
mortgagee a prior notice in writing. Judgment of conviction
reversed.
Robert R. Elledge and Muir Wooley for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and G. A. Strader,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, § 100; Am.Jur., Chattel
Mortgages, § 272.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Chattel Mortgages, § 112.

